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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.JOHN P . .JONES, t 
Plain.tiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 
) 
11171 
ACME BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. 
and GORDON G. LEE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Third District Court for 
Salt Lake County from a Declaratory .Judgment entered 
and filed on the 2nd day of .January, 1968, hy the Honor-
able Leonard W. Elton. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek reversal of the Declaratory 
Judgment entered herein holding that the words "net 
1 
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worth'' in the Memorandum of Under.standing and 
Agreement dated July 22, 196$, meant net worth based 
on book value of Acme Building Products, Inc. as of July 
1, 1966. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant commenced this action by filing a com-
plaint under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Section 
78-33-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated (1953) alleging a 
di·spute between the parties with respect to various par-
ticulars of an agreement dated the 22nd day of July, 1966 
(Exhibit 1) and specifically with respect to the value of 
the interest pos·sessed by the plaintiff in the defendant 
corp·oration, the procedure for determining such value, 
and the subsequent payment thereof to the plaintiff. The 
defendants admitted the dispute, but alleged there was 
no basis therefor, thus framing the issue. 
As a result of stipulation by the parties, a hearing 
was held on October 10, 1967, befor·e Judge Elton for the 
limited purpose of interpreting the words "net worth" 
as used in paragraphs 2 and 3 ·of Exhibit 1 which pro· 
vide: 
'' 2. When the foregoing Releases are secured 
1 
and/or the events take place, and it is determin~d 
the net worth value applicable to the interest m 
Acme Building Products, Inc., now owned by J obn 
P. Jones, then J.ohn P. Jones will quit-clai.m.all 
right, title, and interes.t in 1said ~cme Bmldmg 
Products, Inc., to the said corporation. 
"3. As a condition to the afol'esaid Release of 
all the interest in the business by John P. Jones, 
2 
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it is understood and agreed that a financial state-
ment will be first drawn as of July 1, 1966, and 
that Gordon Lee and John P. Jones, with the aid 
of Jerry Branagan aud Allen E. Mecham, will ne-
gotiate a~d. enter into an Agreement whereby 
Acme Bmldmg Products, Inc. will agree to pay 
.John P. Jones upon terms as set forth by John P. 
Jones as a result of said negotiation, the balance 
due to him from an accounting which reflects the 
net worth of ~he said Acme Building Products, 
Inc." (emphasis added) 
At the hearing before Judge Elton on October 10, 
1967, the facts and circumstances surrounding the execu-
tion of Exhibit 1 were presented by the parties. Summar-
izing from the transcript of proceedings, they are as 
follows: 
John P. Jones, plaintiff and appellant, and Gordon 
G. Lee, defendant and respondent, had been the owners 
of the defendant corporation, Acme Building Products, 
Inc. for a period of ,six and one-third years, each party 
owning one-half of the outstanding shares (TR 67, 84). 
During the latter part of this period, the parties had 
frequent disputes and as a result, they had discussed the 
possibility of one ·Or the other parties disassociating from 
the business (TR 67-68). These discussions took place 
at least once a year, if not oftener (TR 67). In May of 
1966, such a meeting took place with Jones, Lee, Jerry 
Branao-an and Allen Mecham present in Mr. Mecham's 
b ' 
offi<.e. (TR 11, 33, 43, 106). At the time of that meeting, 
it had not been decided which party would disassociate 
from the corporation or how the disassociation was to be 
3 
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accomplished (TR 46, 47, 48, 69). This meeting was the 
only time prior to the execution of Exhibit 1 that a 
method ·of placing a value on the corporate stock was 
discussed. 
On the 23rd day of June, Mr. Mecham, attorney for 
the corporation and a member of the Board of Directors 
of Acme, wrote Mr. Lee in regard to his draws from the 
corporation. (Exhibit 6). Mr. Jones testified that within 
a few days after June 23, Mr. Lee drew another $450.00 
and Mr. Mecham wrote another letter suggesting that he 
(Mr. Lee) resign from the Board of Directors (TR 71 and 
108). 
Some time prior to July 22, (the agreement date) 
Lee came to Mecham and advised him that an obligation 
which both the parties had personally guaranteed to the 
Stewarts and Greens on a stock purchase contract could 
be assumed by Lee and Jones would be released from 
any liability (TR 97). Mr. Mecham testified that when 
he learned of that possibility he stopped at Mr. Jones' 
home one evening to discuss the matter and this was the 
first time Mecham thought it pos·sible for Lee to be the 
survivor of the two (TR 97). That discussion between 
Mecham and Jones was the beginning of the negotiations 
which resulted in the drafting and execution of Memo. 
randum of Understanding and Agreement (Exhibit 1). 
At Mecham's suggestion, Mr. Jones prepared a list of 
the things that he fe.lt he had coming and gave it to 
Mecham so that the Memorandum could be drawn and 
presented to Lee (TR 72, 73, 97). The document wa·s pre-
4 
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pared by .Mecham and was later executed by the parties . 
.Jones resigned as an officer and director of the corpora-
tion and terminated his employment with the company 
which paid him a ·Salary of $18,000.00 per year. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN RULING 
THE TERl\1 ''NET WORTH'' AS USED IN EXHIBIT 
ONE WAS THE BOOK VALUE OF THE STOCK IN 
DEFENDANT CORPORATION AS OF JULY 1, 1966. 
The subject of the legal interpretation of contracts 
and agreements has been classified into numerous rules 
by the decisions, legal texts, and treatises through the 
years. It now is only a matter of defining nature of the 
problem to be resolved, selecting the 0orrect rules to be 
applied to the problem, and then applying the rules to 
the evidence to resolve the issue uetween the litigants. 
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
In order to define the nature of the problem, it must 
be determined what kind of a contract or agreement was 
entered into between the parties. 3 Williston on Contracts 
§604. Here we have a fully integrated written memoran-
dum of understanding and agreement (Restatement of 
Contracts §228) between three different parties, to wit: 
.John P. Jones, Gordon Lee, and Acme Building Products, 
5 
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Inc., a corporation, (Exhibit 1). The expressed intention 
of the parties in the writing is found in the three 
"Whereas" clauses at the beginning of the document 
which are as follows: 
''Whereas both Messrs.Jones and Lee desire to 
disassociate themselves in the conduct of the busi-
ness known as Acme Building Products, Inc. and 
''Whereas, Gordon Lee has indicated a willin"-
ness to continue the operations of Acme Buildi;g 
Products, Inc., and John P. Jones has indicated 
a willingness to disassociate himself fr.om said 
business ; and, 
''Whereas, it is agreed by both John P. Jones 
and Gordon Lee that the income from Acme Build-
ing Products, Inc. can be used to purchase the net 
worth value of the business accrued to the account 
of J,ohn P. Jones." 
This expressed intent of parties to the contract is con-
trolling upon the court unless same is insufficient in 
describing the intention of the parties. 17 Am Jr 2d 633, 
Contracts §245. Ephraim Theater Company v. Hawk 7 
Utah 2d 163, 321 P2d 221 (1958). 
The district court was requested to interpret the 
phrase ''net worth'' as used in the body of the agree-
ment in paragraphs two and three which is quoted above. 
The parties agreed that the words "net worth" were 
ambiguous, in that they were susceptible to more than 
one interpretation, and the court hearing was held to 
determine the meaning of said words by the use of parol 
evidence, if necessary. 
6 
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'l'herefore, the problem is one of interpreting the 
11or<ls "net wort1" as used in paragraphs two and three 
of the fully integrated written agreement '"herein the 
parties have expressly stated their intentiolls and where 
i! was agreed that the words 1Yere susceptiulc to more 
! lian one interpretation. 
THE RULES 'l'O BE APPLIED 
Restatement of Contracts §230 states the rule to be 
applied, or the standard of intorpretatio11, where there is 
an integration. 
"The standard of interpretation of an integra-
tion, except where it produces an ambiguous 
result, or is excluded by a rule establishing a def-
inite meaning, is the moaning that would be 
attached to the integration by a reasonably intel-
ligent person acquainted with all operative usages 
and knowing all the cirC'umstanC'os prior to and 
contemporaneous with the making of the integra-
tion, other than oral statements by the parties of 
what they intended it to mean." 
This standard of interpretation is tho primary 
wurre when there is an integration as in tho case at hand. 
'rho objective viewpoint of a third person is taken who 
has knowledge of all operative usages as well as of other 
accompanying cirrnmstances. Oral statements by the 
parties of what they intended the written language to 
moan are excluded even though such statements might 
show the parties gave their words a meaning that would 
not otherwise be apparent. Restatement of Contracts 
§2:)0, Comment (a). 
7 
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Additional rules can be used to aid in the application 
of the foregoing standard if necessary. These are found 
in Restatement of Contracts §235 and 3 Williston §618. 
Those applicable to the problem at hand are: 
(a) Technical terms and words of art are given their 
technical meaning unless the context or usage which 
is applicable indicates a different meaning. Williston 
states that this rule will yield if the application of 
other primary rules show a contrary meaning. 3 
Williston §618. 
(b) The writing will be read as a whole, and every 
part will be interpreted with reference to the whole; 
and if possible, it will be so interpreted as to give 
effect to its general purpose. In general, a word 
used by the parties in one sense is to be interpreted 
as employed in the same sense through out the writ-
ing in the absence of countervailing reasons. 3 
Williston §618, Restatement of Contracts §235. 
This Court has on numerous occasions adopted all 
the foregoing rules of contract interpretation. See: Corn-
wall v. Willow Creek Co'Ulntry Club; 13 Utah 2d 160; 369 
P2d 928 (1962), Ephraim Theater Company v. Hawk, 7 
Utah 2d 163, 321 P2d 221 (1958); Maw v. Noble, 19 Utah 
2d 440, 354 P2d 121 (1960); Vitagraph, Inc. v. American 
Theatre Co. 77 Utah 76, 291 P2d 303 (1930); Mathis v. 
Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P2d 952 (1953); Con-
tinental Bank and Trust Co. v. R. W. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 
288, 291 P2d 890 ( 1955), Plain City Irrigatio•n Co. v. 
Hooper Irrigation Co., 11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P2d 625 
(1960). 8 
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APPLICATION OF THE RULES 
'rhe net worth of a business has been defined as the 
remainder after deduction of liabilities from assets. 
Miner Inc. v. Peerless Equipment, 115 F2d 650, 7th Cir. 
(1940), Castelli v. Tolibia, 83 NYS2d 554, Eastern Capi-
tal Corp. v. Freeman, Hi8 NYS2d 834 (1957). Both certi-
fied public accountants who testified agreed that in an 
accounting sense net worth meant assets less liabilities 
' 
or stated another way, it is the capital account plus the 
surplus account. However, the term net worth is not a 
precise term, in that the use of the term itself does not 
enable one to determine how the assets or what assets 
would be valued (TR 38, 39, 59, 63, & 83). Therefore, net 
worth i,s to some extent a technical term meaning assets 
less liabilities, but without defining the term further, and 
depending on the context and surrounding circumstances, 
it can either mean the actual value of all assets of a com-
pany or the value of merely those assets carried by the 
company on its books at the depreciated value or at some 
other means of valuation. Principles of Accounting by 
Finney and Miller, page 47. 
Knowing foregoing accounting definition of "net 
worth", our reasonably intelligent third person in Re-
statement of Oontracts §230 must also keep in mind the 
sunounding circumstances prior to and contemporaneous 
with the making of the agreement. All of the circum-
stanees cannot be cited here, but those of greatest impor-
tance are as follows: 
(1) The parties, J.ones and Lee, each owned one-half 
9 
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of the outstanding stock in the corporation an<l hv 
this writing they were atternpti11g to senorc thei,r 
six and one-third year relationship. 
(2) The withdrawing party, .Tones, was giYing 11p uo! 
only his stock ownership in the eorporation, but also 
his $18,000.00 per year position as president. 
(3) The remaining party, Lee, would become the sole 
stockholder in the corporation after the corporation 
had purchased the stock owned by Jones. 
( 4) The corporation's capital assets were carried on 
the corporation books at their depreciated value and 
the method of depreciation used was a double-declin-
ing balance or accelerated method which depreciate> 
the assets faster in the first five years (TR 58). 
( 5) The only discussion between the parties abou! 
the term book value in attempting to set a buyout 
price t·o·ok place sometime in May of 1966, an<l at that 
time the negotiations had not yet been commenced 
which rnsulted in the drafting of the agreement here 
in question. This meeting with Jones, Lee, the C.P.A 
Branagan, and Allen Mecham was one of a long 
series ·of meetings and not in any way related to the 
contents of said agreement (TR 43, 44, 46, 68 & 69). 
(6) The withdrawing party, J•ohn P .. Jones, was told 
by the author of the agreement, prior to its exerution, 
to make a list of the items he would want in consider-
ation for his withdrawing from the business. No dis-
cussions ever took place prior to the execution of the 
10 
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agreement as to what the words "net worth" as used 
in paragraph three were intended to mean. 
~With knowledge of the definition of "net worth" 
and of the fore going circumstances, our reasionably intel-
ligent third person should now be able to interpret the 
words ''net worth'' as used in paragraph three of the 
agreement. To conclude that the parties intended them to 
mean the book value of the stock in the corporation pro-
duces a totally unrealistic and unreasonable result. 
It is interesting to note that the author of Exhibit 1 
used the term net worth three different times. First, in 
the third introductory paragraph: 
"vVHEREAS, it is agreed by both John P. 
Jones and Gordon Lee that the income from Acme 
Building Products, Inc. can be used to purchase 
the NET WORTH value of the business accrued 
to the account of John P. Jones." (emphasis 
added). 
Second, in paragraph number two: 
"\Vhen the foregoing releases are secured 
and/or the events take place, and it is determined 
the NET WORTH value applicable to the interest 
in Acme Building Products, Inc. now owned by 
John P. Jones, then John P. Jones will quit-claim 
all right, title, and interest in any stock or intere~dt 
in said Acme Building Products, Inc. to the sa1 
corpora ti on.'' (emphasis added). 
Third, in paragraph number three: 
''As a con di ti on to the afore said Release of 
all the interest in the business by John P. Jones, 
11 
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it is understood and agreed that a financial state-
ment will be first drawn as of July 1, 1966, and 
that Gordon Lee and John P. Jones, with the aid 
of Jerry Branagan and Allen E. l'v[echam, will 
negotiate. an_d enter into an Agreement whereby 
Acme Bmldmg Products, Inc. will agree to pay 
John P. Jones upon terms as set forth by John P. 
J·ones as a result of said negotiation, the balance 
due to him from an accounting which reflects the 
NET WOR.TH of the said Acme Building Prod-
ucts, Inc.'' (emphasis added) 
One of \Villiston 's rules of interpretation states: 
'' ... In general, a word used by the parties in 
one sense is to be interpreted as employed in the 
same sense throughout the writing in the absence 
of contervailing reasons." 3 Williston §618. 
If the words net worth in paragraph three mean net 
worth based upon the book value of the stock of the cor-
poration, then they ·should als•o mean the same thing in 
the third introductory paragraph and in paragraph two. 
Such an interpretation cannot in any way be made with-
out destroying the whole context of both usage·s of the 
wo·rds. 
The expressed intent of the parties is found within 
the four corners of the instrument and that intent must 
govern. Ephrairn Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 
163, 321 P2d 221 (1958). The parties were attempting to 
sever their joint ownership of a going business and in 
doing so the surviving party wa·s to pay to the departing 
party, through the corporate facade, all of hi·s interest in 
the business, not merely the hook value of his corporate 
stock. 
12 
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rrhis court stated in Plain City Irrigation Company 
v. Hooper Irrigation Company, 11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P2d 
625, 628 (1960): 
"Generally, where there is doubt about the 
interpretation of a contract, a fair and equitable 
result will be pref erred over a harsh or unreason-
able one. And an interpretation that will produce 
an inequitable result will be adopted only where 
the contract so expressly and unequivocally so 
pr·ovides that there is no other reasonable inter-
pretation to be given to it." 
If net worth in Paragraph 3 of Exhibit 1 is inter-
preted to mean net worth based upon book value of the 
corporation as of July 1, 1966, the resulting consequences 
to the withdrawing party is unreasonable. The assets of 
the corporationwere being depreciated at an accelerated 
rate and the actual or real value may exceed the de-
preciated value (TR 58). Therefore, Gordon Lee, as the 
sole stockholder ·Of the corporation after the purchase of 
John Jones' stock, could liquidate all the assets at their 
market value, pay off the liabilities, and have a hand-
some win-all. Such a result was certainly not contem-
plated by the parties to the agreement. Whereas, such an 
unreasonable result would not be possible if the with-
drawing party were paid all of his interest based upon 
the actual or real value of the corporate assets as con-
templated by the agreement as a whole and specifically 
paragraphs two and three which refer t10 " ... all right, 
title, and interest in any stock or interest in ,said Acme 
... '' and ''As a condition of the aforesaid Release of all 
the interest in the business ... '' 
13 
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POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT RUL. 
ING THAT THE TERM "NET WORTH" AS USED 
IN EXHIBIT ONE MEANT THE ACTUAL NET 
VALUE OF THE CORPORATION. 
The fact that the instrument here in question was 
poorly drawn does not relieve the court of its responsi-
bility to ascertain its meaning if at all possible. Mathis v. 
Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P2d 952 (1953). When 
the meaning of ambiguous words in a contract can be 
clarified by reference to other parts of the contract, or 
where ambiguity arises by reason of the language used 
and not because of extrinsic facts, the court must inter-
pret the words as a matter of law. Paclawski v. Bristol 
Laboratories, Inc. Okl, 425 P2d 452, 456 (1967). 
An intergrated contract cannot he varied, modified, 
or ciontradicted by parol evidence and its interpretation 
is a question of law for the court. Pacific States Cast Iron 
Pipe Co. v. Harsh Utah Corp. 5 Utah 2d 244, 300 P2d 610, 
616 (1956). 
Chief Justice Wolfe in Mat his v. Mads en, supra, at 
page 956, adopting the trial court's memorandum deci-
sion ·stated: 
"In searching for the meaning the court must 
first examine the language used in the instrument 
itself and accord to it the weight and effect which 
the instrument itself may show that the parties 
intended the words to hav·e. If then its meaning 
is still ambiguous or uncertain, the court may con· 
14 
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sider other co_ntemporaneous writings concerning 
the ,same subJect matter, and may, if still uncer-
tain, consider parole evidence of the parties' in-
tention.'' 
Applying the foregoing principals and those rules 
stated in Point One herein, the trial court should have 
concluded that ''net worth'' as used in the agreement 
meant the actual net value of the corporation as opposed 
to its ruling that it meant mere boiok value of the corpora-
tion's stock. The plaintiff was not merely selling stock 
baek to a corporation; he was giving up all those things 
that the stock he owned represented including an 
$18,000.00 per year salary, rone-half ownership in a going 
business which was making a profit at the time the trans-
action was entered into, one-half interest in the assets 
owned by the corporation, and the attendant power to 
determine the use to which those assets would be put to 
bring him a return '0'11 his investment. None of these 
items are taken into consideration in determining book 
value of corporate stock. However, if the actual net value 
of the corporation is used in determining what the plain-
tiff would receive fior all his interest in the corporation, 
the basis of the bargain between the parties is more 
realistically arrived at. Depreciated value of assets have 
no relationship to the actual value of a corporation. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa has been often cron-
fronted with an analogous situation in cases commenced 
under a statute providing for the payment of the real 
value .of the stock owned by a stockholder voting against 
renewal of a corporate existence. In Woodward v. Quig-
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ley, Iowa, 133 N.,V. 2d 38 ( 1965) the court uses rnriou, 
formulae and calculations to arrive at a figure whicl1 
would represent the real value of descenting stock 
holder's stock. The "net asset value" of the corporatio11 
was used in this determination. Sueh a method of evalua. 
tion takes into consideration all those factors which must 
necessarily be considered in arriving at an equitable price 
for the stock. Such a method of evaluation could be used 
in the case at hand to arrive at the real value of the 
plaintiff's interest in Acme Building Products, Inc. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's finding that words "net worth" as 
used in the Memorandum of Understanding and Agree· 
ment meant the net worth of the corporation based upon 
book value of the corporation is unreasonable when the 
correct principals of contract interpretation are applied. 
This court is respectfully requested to reverse the 
trial court's holding and hold as a matter of law that the 
words "net worth" as used in the agreement meant the 
actual net value of the corporation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BROWNING & YOCOM 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
